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Abstract 
This paper examines the joint determinants of women's choice of work and 
fertility within the Nash-bargaining framework using household survey data from 
urban Tamil Nadu, India. The labor force participation decision is formulated 
in a dichotomous and trichotomous choice framework. Alternative estimation 
methods are used to estimate the parameters of the wage and the choice of work 
equations. The empirical results show that women do not regard the decision to 
participate in wage work as identical to self employment. The trichotomous model 
emerges as the preferred formulation of women's work decision. The results 
suggest that an increase in women's wage would draw more women into wage work and 
self employment and concomitantly reduce fertility. The neoclassical common 
preference model of the family is rejected in the choice of work but not in the 
fertility decisions. The estimates of the wage equations indicate a private rate 
of return to education of 13 percent for women and 11 percent for men. 
KEY WORDS: Women' work, wages, fertility, India. 
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Women's Choice of Work and Fertility in Urban Tamil Nadu, India 
I. Introduction: 
A voluminous literature on labor supply in both developed and developing 
countries has treated the number of children as an exogenous determinant of 
women's labor force participation decision (Heckman 1974, Smith 1980, 
Killingsworth 1983, · Malathy 1991). In contrast to these studies, a vast 
literature treats fertility as a choice variable (Becker 1960, Willis 1973, 
T.W. Schultz 1974, and the studies reviewed in Schultz 1988b,1993). Attempts 
have also been made to model and estimate female labor supply and fertility in 
a simultaneous equation framework (Cain and Dooley 1976, Schultz 1977, Fleisher 
and Rhodes 1979). It·is increasingly recognized that identifying the underlying 
structural relationships is difficult and empirical studies often use arbitrary 
identifying restrictions. It is possible to estimate the simultaneous 
relationship between labor supply and fertility only under special situations 
such as the occurrence of twins as demonstrated in Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980). 
Hence, a number of studies estimate the joint determinants of labor supply and 
fertility using a common set of exogenous variables and try to elucidate the 
inherent association between these two variables (McCabe and Rosenzweig 1976, 
Schultz 1990). In this paper, I present estimates of the joint determinants of 
labor force participation of women and fertility in the context of a developing 
country namely India. 
Most of the studies on women's labor supply have considered only the work-
nowork distinction. This may be appropriate in the context of developed 
countries where women's participation in the informal or self employed activities 
is low. In the developing countries, in contrast, a large proportion of women 
engage in occupations such as household industries, family enterprises, own 
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farms, etc., which are characterized by flexibility of work hours, absence of 
fixed costs of working etc.,. Hence, the decision to enter the labor market as 
a wage worker may be distinct from the decision to be self employed. It is 
important to understand the role of economic factors such as wages and income on 
the choice of work - no work, wage work and self employment. 1 
A small number of studies examine women's participation decision in formal­
informal or wage work-self employment activities (Hill 1983, Behrman and Wolfe 
1984, Blau 1985, Vijverberg 1986, 1990, Rees and Shah 1986,Khandker 1987). The 
differences in these occupations not only affect the choice of occupation itself 
but may also play an important role in fertility decisions because the 
informal/self employment sector is characterized, among other things, by the 
compatibility of the job with child care. However, no attempt has been made to 
study the joint determination of choice of work and fertility in the developing 
country context. 
High fertility and low level of female participation in labor market 
activities are distinguishing characteristics of the Indian economy. The 
available evidence indicates that the crude worker to population ratio for urban 
women has increased from 13.2 percent in 1972-73 to 15.3 percent in 1977-78 and 
has remained more or less stable thereafter. That is, the ratio is 14.9 and 15.2 
percent in 1983 and 1987-88 respectively (Visaria and Minhas 1991). 2 The data 
also suggest that the proportion of working women in self employed activities has 
declined from 49.5 percent in 1977-78 to 45.8 percent in 1983. During the same 
period, the female share of regular/salaried and casual workers has increased 
from 24.0 and 25.6 percent to 25.8 and 28.4 percent respectively (Sarvekshana 
1988). There has also been a steady decline in the total fertility rate between 
1972 and 1988. The total fertility rate has come down from 5.17 in 1972 to 4.2 
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in 1988 (World Bank, World Development Report (various issues). We may infer 
from the aggregate evidence that with the process of development, more women may 
participate in the labor force and more of them may enter into wage work. The 
declining fertility, though by no means dramatic, may also be associated with the 
changing productive roles of women. 
It would be instructive, in this context, to examine the factors 
determining women's choice of work and family size. The available Indian studies 
on labor supply (Rosenzweig 1978,1980,1982, Bardhan 1984) and fertility 
(Rosenzweig and Evenson 1977, Rosenzweig 1982, Duraisamy 1988, Duraisamy and 
Malathy 1991) are confined to rural areas. No attempt has been made to study the 
determinants of fertility of urban women. In the earlier works, I have analyzedc 
the labor supply behavior of urban women using a dichotomous (work, nowork) model 
(Malathy 1983, 1989, 1991). 3 In this paper, I also study the trichotomous 
choice of no work, wage work and self employment using a large and representative 
household survey data for urban Tamil Nadu. Another concern of this paper is to 
investigate the role of women's status measured by women's control over 
resources, on the choice of work and fertility using the Nash bargaining approach 
(Manser and Brown 1979,1980, McElroy and Horney 1981, McElroy 1990). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. A brief outline of the 
theoretical framework is presented in Section II. In section III, the data, 
empirical specification and estimation strategies are discussed. Section IV 
provides the estimation results. Section V summarizes the findings. 
II. Theoretical Framework: 
The household's decision regarding labor supply and demand for child 
services are usually analyzed within a neoclassical household utility 
maximization framework in the tradition of Becker (1965,1981). The individual's 
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(husband or wife) preference over number of children (N), leisure of the wife 
(Lw) and a composite consumption commodity (C) can be represented as 
(1) 
where Ui is the utility function of the ith individual. The children are 
produced within the household using individual's time input (TNi), and market 
purchased goods (X). The production function for N can be specified as 
(2) N = N(X, TNi), i = h, w 
The family is assumed to maximize the utility function subject to the production 
function (2), the time constraint (3) 
(3) Ti = TNi + Li + Hi + Mi, i = h,w 
where Ti is the total available time and Hand Mare the total time spent in 
market work and housework respectively, and a budget constraint (4) 
( 4) PX = WhHh + Wwlfw + V 
where Wi is the wage rate (i=h, w), and Vis the total family nonearned income. 
The demand functions arising out the utility maximization process can be written 
as 
(5) Dij = Dij(P, Ww, Wh, Vi ) , i = h, w; j = N, i.w, C 
The indirect utility function based on the demand function (5) can be 
written as 
( 6) v ij = Vj ( P , ww, wh , vi ) , j = N, Lw, c ; i = h , w 
The Nash-bargaining model assumes that partners co-operatively maximize the 
product of the differences in each individual's utility from belonging to the 
family (1) and a threat-point utility, the individual indirect utility (6), which 
represents the utility to the individual if she/he quits the family union: 
(7) Tii[Ui(N, L, C;µ)-Vi(P,Ww, Wh)], i=h,w 
The family demand function's arising out of the maximization process of (7) 
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can be written as 
(8) Yj = Yj (Pj, Ww, Wh, Vw, Vh; µ) 
where j = C,H are the demand for number of children C, and His labor supply 
(converse of leisure demand that is the argument in the welfare function); Ww, 
Wh, Vw, and Vh are the wages and non-earned incomes of the wife and husband 
respectively, and Pj is price of market goods. 
The non-earned incomes Vi, i = w,h are individual specific and are assumed 
to enhance the individual member's bargaining strength. If the behavioral 
effects of spouse specific non-earned income are identical, then pooling of 
family resources assumed in the common preference model can be accepted. On the 
other hand, if individual specific non-earned income exert different effects, 
then this evidence favors the bargaining approach. The equality of these effects 
are tested empirically in. this study. 
III. Date, Empirical Specification and Estimation Strategies: 
The data source is the 1990-91 primary survey of urban households in Tamil 
Nadu, India, conducted by me. The survey was funded by a grant from the 
Rockefeller Foundation Program at the Economic Growth Center, Yale University. 
Tamil Nadu has a relatively large urban population of about 33 percent in 
1981 which is much higher than the all India average of about 23 percent. 
Further, the urban population in the state is spread among various size classes 
of urban agglomerations and towns. 
The first stage in the sampling process is the choice of districts for 
which I have used the National Sample Survey classification of the entire state 
into four agroclimatic regions, and randomly selected two districts from each 
region. The districts chosen as our study areas have urban population ranging 
between 23 and 50 percent of the total population in the district. Four of these 
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districts are major urban agglomerations. 
The second stage is the choice of towns from each district. For this 
purpose the towns in each district were classified according to population size 
classes: Class I towns with population of 100,000 and over, Class II with 50,000 
to 100,000 population, and Class III with 20,000 to 50,000 population. One town 
from each population size class has been randomly selected. 
In selecting the households from each town, I used the census 
classification of towns into divisions. The list of divisions, the streets in 
each division, and number of households are published in district census 
handbooks. Ten percent of the divisions in each town has been taken and ten 
households from each division were taken by a systematic sampling procedure. A 
household was included if it had at least one married couple with wife aged 15-
50. Thus the sample size consist of 1276 husband-wife households. 
The linear approximation of the demand functions (8) for fertility and 
labor supply can be specified as 
(9) N = a'Z + e 
(10) Hw = fi'Z + u 
where Z = [P, Ww, Wh, Vw, Vh, BJ is a vector of prices, wages, nonlabor income 
and a set of control variables (B), and e and u denote the stochastic disturbance 
terms. 4 
The reduced form labor supply equation (10) denotes total labor supply 
which is composed of the decision to participate in market work and the number 
of hours conditional on participation. The participation and conditional hours 
of work equations can be specified as 
(11) P = 7'Z + £1 
(12) H* 5'Z += c2 
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where H* is the hours of work conditional on participation, E(Hi H>O). By 
estimating equations ( 11) and ( 12) we can retrieve the implied total labor supply 
parameters. 
In the above participation equation, Pis usually defined as a dichotomous 
variable taking the value of one if a woman participates (work) in the labor 
market and zero if she does not work (no work). This however imposes the 
restriction that the woman views all types of work as the same. As indicated 
earlier, this is not true where the size of the self employed activities is 
substantial and where these two sectors, wage work and self employment, are 
distinct due to flexible working hours and compatibility with child care in self 
employment. · It is important to test whether the decision to participate -is•­
distinct from the decision to participate in wage work or self employment 
activities that is, whether the trichotomous model simply collapses to the 
dichotomous model. 
The estimation strategy involves the following steps. First, market wage 
rates are estimated for men and women correcting for selectivity bias (Heckman 
1974). Alternative wage imputation procedures are developed in the literature. 
The widely used procedure consists of estimating participation in wage work and 
wage equation by joint maximum likelihood methods. However, this method treats 
the self employed and non workers alike. Another method is the extension of 
Heckman (1976) procedure to control for possible selectivity due to labor force 
participation and sectoral sorting decisions (Behrman and Wolfe 1984, Schultz 
1990). A problem with this method is that the two selection correction terms are 
likely to be collinear and could yield misleading conclusions about the 
selectivity problem. A third procedure involves estimating a trichotomous 
participation decision model (nowork, wage work, self employment) and using the 
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parameter estimates for selectivity correction in the wage equation for the 
sample of wage workers. 
Second, alternative specifications of the labor force model, namely the 
dichotomous and the trichotomous models, are analyzed using probit, legit and 
multinomial legit models. The specification test, namely log likelihood ratio 
test, is applied to choose between the dichotomous and trichotomous legit models. 
Third, the fertility decision of the women is analyzed. The number of 
children ever born equation is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares ( OLS) method. 5 
Since women in the sample belong to different stages in the life cycle, the 
children ever born equations are re-estimated for three age cohorts - 20-29, 30-
39 and 40-49 to examine the different effect by age of woman. 
The measurement of the endogenous and exogenous variables are discussed 
below. The description of the variables and their means and standard deviations 
are given in Table 1. 
The dependent variable, labor force participation, is defined as 
dichotomous and trichotomous variables. The participation dichotomous variable 
takes the value of 1 if a woman participates in market work or self employment 
activities and zero if she does not. Additionally a dichotomous variable in wage 
work is defined as a dummy taking the value of 1 if the women is a wage worker 
and zero otherwise. The trichotomous measure of the labor force participation 
variable takes the value of O if she does not work, 1 if she is self employed and 
2 if she is a wage worker. The fertility variable is measured as children ever 
born to a woman 20-50 years. This is a stock variable measuring cumulative or 
completed fertility. Many women in the sample have not completed their fertility 
and restricting analysis to older women reduces the sample size, lowers the 
precision of estimates, and also entails a problem of incorrect reporting 
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especially common to older women (Boulier and Rosenzweig, 1978). To overcome 
this problem and to include women who have not completed fertility, some 
researchers have included wife's age at marriage or duration of marriage as 
conditioning variables. But these variables are themselves endogenous and will 
hence bias parameter estimates. A second procedure is to adjust cumulative 
fertility of incomplete families, as was done by Boulier and Rosenzweig (1978) 
which considers the ratio of children ever born to the number a women could have 
according to some natural fertility schedule, assuming fertility control 
commences immediately after marriage. Anderson ( 1983) makes a biological 
adjustment by estimating demand for children constrained by a non-linear 
biological supply function. This function itself is fit to the observed pattern­
of fertility growth that is implied by cross-age sample and hence does not depend 
on a natural fertility schedule which is itself an average measure derived on the 
basis of another country's birth rates. I have not attempted any such 
. standardization in this study. However, I report estimates for three age cohorts 
of women - less than 29, 30-39, and 40-49 years. This permits the variables to 
have different impacts since women in different age groups may have faced 
different environments. Additionally, such a stratification of the sample may 
reduce biases arising from the incomparability of the fertility measures across 
age cohorts. Among the older women, who will have completed their fertility, the 
estimates are easier to interpret. 
The list of explanatory variables include wage rates, non earned income of 
wife and husband, and wife's age. Non-linearity in the effects of wages, non 
earned income and wife's age are expected and interactions among the variables 
are explored. 
The wages of wife and husband are predicted from the regression estimates 
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reported in Tables 2 and 3. The own wage effect on labor force participation is 
expected to be positive on the assumption that the substitution effect outweighs 
the income effect. The sign of husband's wage (cross wage) effect is expected 
to be negative on wife's labor force participation (Killingsworth, 1983). We may 
expect the own and cross wages to have the same response in wage employment and 
self employment as on labor force participation. Whether more women would be 
drawn into or out of wage work or self employment as the wage rates change cannot 
be predicted and is an empirical question. The effects of wages of husband and 
wife are expected to be negative on fertility on the assumption that children are 
intensive in parents' time and the income effects are dominated by the 
substitution effects. However, the effect of mother's wage would b§l larger.,. 
(negative) than the father's wage since children are more intensive in mother's 
time. 
The non-earned income variables of the wife and husband are included 
separately and are measured as the money (rupee) value of the total stock of 
assets held individually by them. It is generally expected that the pure income 
effect due to an increase in assets will reduce labor supply (increase leisure 
which is a normal good), and increase the demand for children if children are 
assumed to be a normal good. However, the response of woman's labor supply and 
fertility to the asset variable may be systematically different depending on who 
owns the assets. The responsiveness to increases in her wealth may be more 
negative on labor supply and more positive on child services than the 
responsiveness to an increase in her husband's assets. 
Age of wife is included to capture the cohort effect and as a sample 
biological adjustment factor. To allow for non-linear effects of age, I also 
include a squared term in age. 
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V. Empirical Results: 
A. Estimates of Wage Equations: 
Tables 2 and 3 present the results for the sample selection corrected wage 
equations for women and men respectively. In both the tables, column (1) 
presents the estimates of reduced form participation equation and column 2 and 
3 are the joint Maximum likelihood estimates of the wage work status and log 
hourly wage equations. The dual selection correction terms computed from the 
participation and wage work equations are introduced in the Heckman two step 
method in column 4. Columns 5 and 6 present the multinomial logit estimates of 
self employment and wage work status and the selection correction term from the 
wage work parameter estimates is introduced in the wage equation given in the 
last column. The reduced form dichotomous and trichomotous participation 
parameter estimates given in columns 1,2,5 and 6 show that all the variables 
significantly affect the probability that a woman would participate in market 
work and be in the wage sector but not being self employed. More schooling and 
experience (defined as age minus schooling minus six) significantly increase the 
returns from market relative to non-market activities and is strongly associated 
with working and being a wage worker. The income effect operating through the 
spouse specific asset coefficients reduce the likelihood of working and also 
entering the wage sector. The corresponding estimates for men are reported in 
table 3. The Wald test rejects the null hypothesis of equal asset effect at 5 
percent level of significance only in the equations for women. A likelihood ratio 
test is performed on the dichotomous versus the trichotomous model. The reported 
x2 test statistics with 7 degrees of freedom is 68.56 and is significant at the 
1 percent level, indicating that the trichotomous model is preferred to the 
dichotomous model for women. Men's labor force behavior 'is also preferably 
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represented by the trichotomous model for which the relevant x2 test statistic 
is 66.12. 
The parameter estimates of the semi logarithmic wage equations show that 
wage increases with education and increases at a decreasing rate with experience 
for both women and men. Both education and experience coefficients are 
statistically significant at 1 percent level for women and men except the 
experience squared terms in the equation with the double selection terms. The 
private rate return to education of women is 13 percent and 11 percent for men. 
This finding of higher returns to women's education is found in several other 
developing countries such as Indonesia, Columbia, Brazil, Taiwan, India (Andhra 
Pradesh), and Ivory Coast (Schultz, 1988a). 
The joint maximum likelihood probit and multinomial logit estimates given 
in columns 3 and 7 show that the selectivity bias is important for women but not 
for men. The estimated rho, which represents the correlation between the error 
terms of the probit and the log wage equation, is positive and significantly 
different from zero for women but not for men. This implies that estimating the 
wage equations on a selective sample of workers would yield biased estimates for 
women. The double selection correction terms are not statistically significant 
for women, probably due to the high correlation. However, the selection term on 
wage earner status is statistically significant for males. The education and 
experience coefficients are stable across specifications for women but not for 
men for whom the double selection correction increases the returns to education 
and reduces the returns to experience. 
B. Estimates of Labor Force Participation and Choice of Work Equations : 
Table 4, presents the estimates of the labor force participation equations 
for women. Even though the trichotomous model emerges as the preferred 
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formulation, estimates of the dichotomous models are also presented for 
comparison. Columns 1 and 2 provide the probit estimates of the dichotomous 
characterization of labor force participation and participation in wage work. The 
corresponding partial derivatives are provided in brackets below the 
coefficients. The predicted log hourly wages obtained from the estimates given 
in tables 2 and 3 are correlated with the assets and wife's age variables. The 
predicted log hourly wage are converted into hourly wage and used in the women's 
work and fertility equations. This considerably improve significance of the 
effects assets and women's age variables. 
The results are as expected and in line with those reported in the 
literature. The own wage has a positive effect and the cross wage has a negative 
effect on both measures of labor force participation. Both wife's and husband's 
assets significantly reduce the probability of participation. The Wald test is 
performed to test the equality of the asset coefficients. The null hypothesis 
of equality is rejected at the 5 percent level of confidence or better where the 
x2 statistics is 22.07 and 5.23 with 1 degree of freedom, respectively in the 
participation and wage work equations. 
The parameter estimates of the trichotomous logit model of women's choice 
of work and their corresponding marginal values are presented in columns 3 and 
4 of Table 4. A likelihood ratio is computed to test whether the women's work 
choice is dichotomous or trichotomous. The Chi-square test statistics of 63.46 
with 7 degrees of freedom is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
This implies that the trichotomous formulation of women's choice of work is more 
appropriate. Women's wage exhibits a positive relationship with the likelihood 
of participating in both wage employment and self employment. However, as the 
own wage increases the probability of entering into wage work is higher than 
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being self employed implying that women with high wages are more attracted to the 
formal sector of the labor market. An increase in the husband's wage reduces 
more the probability of participation in wage work than in self employment. This 
seems reasonable considering that self employment may be compatible with 
housework. The implied own wage and cross wage elasticities are 0.42 and 0.39 
for self employed women and 0.56 and 0.40 respectively for wage workers. The 
income effects exerted through the asset coefficients suggest that as assets 
increase, irrespective of who owns it, women tend to be less likely to be a labor 
market participant and the negative effect comes through significantly only in 
the wage earner equation. The pattern of the asset coefficients suggest that the 
women's own asset exerts a bigger work reducing effect. The Wald test 
statistics, given in the last row of table 4, rejects the null hypothesis that 
the effect of assets of husband and wife are equal. 6 
C. Estimates of Fertility Equations: 
Table 5 provides the OLS regression estimates of the fertility equation. 
Column 2 presents the estimates including the quadratic terms in the asset 
variables. An increase in the wage of husband and wife reduces the demand for 
number of children ever born, but the effect is much larger for the wife's wage. 
This suggests that child care is a more mother's time intensive commodity and is 
perceived as a cost of bearing and rearing children. The computed own and cross 
wage elasticities are 0.273 and 0.126 respectively. Earlier we observed that 
female wages have a positive effect on labor force participation and choice of 
wage or self employment work. This suggests that as the attractiveness of a job 
(whether inside the home as a family worker or outside as a wage worker) 
increases, other things remaining the same, there will be a decline in birth 
rates. An increase in women's wage is associated with a reallocation of women's 
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time to market work and especially,to wage work, with a concomitant reduction in 
fertility. 
The income effects are positive and in line with a priori prediction but 
are significant only in the specification including the squared terms in assets. 
This suggests that child services are normal goods. Our results indicate that 
women's assets are associated with a bigger positive demand for children compared 
to her husband's assets. In addition to viewing children as a normal good women 
may consider children also as a productive investment as a potential source of 
support in sickness or old age. The test of equality of asset effect is not 
rejected at any conventional level of significance and implies that the 
distribution of the ownership of nonearned income between the spouses is 
irrelevant for fertility decisions. Interestingly, Schultz(l990) and Thomas 
(1990), reject the income pooling hypothesis in fertility decisions in Thailand 
and Brazil where women's assets exert a larger positive effect than men's assets. 
The OLS estimates of the fertility equations by age cohorts of women are 
presented in Table 6. For the oldest cohort of women the measured fertility 
corresponds to the completed fertility implied by the definition of children ever 
born. If women in the middle cohort 30-39 years stop having children by age 39, 
then for this sample current fertility also corresponds to their completed 
fertility. There is a remarkable consistency in the statistically significant 
fertility reducing effect of women's own wage across the three age cohorts. The 
effect is largest among the oldest age group namely women aged 40-49 years. The 
women's asset effect is statistically significant only among the middle age 
cohorts while the husband's asset effect is significant and positive only among 
the youngest age group, and suggests assets relax the credit restraint effect on 
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starting childbearing, but not an effect on the completed lifetime number of 
births. 
V. Conclusions 
This paper presents estimates of the joint determinants of women's choice 
of work and fertility in the context of urban Tamil Nadu, India. Women's choice 
of work is formulated in a dichotomous and trichotomous framework. The results 
confirm that women in urban Tamil Nadu do not regard the decision to engage in 
wage work as identical to self employment. The empirical results suggest that, 
in general, wife's wage increases the probability of participation more in wage 
•employment compared to self employment. An increase in husband's wage is 
associated with a reduction in the wife's probability of participation in both 
wage employment and self employment. The positive effect of the own wage however 
exceeds the participation reducing effect of the husband's wage in wage 
employment. A 10 percent increase in the wage of wife would increase the woman's 
participation in self employment by 4 percent and in wage work by 6 percent. A 
similar increase in her spouse's wage leads to a reduction in her participation 
in both self employment and wage work by 4 percent. Both husband's and wife's 
wage significantly reduce the demand for children. A ten percent increase in 
wife's and husband's wage rates leads to a reduction in fertility by 3 and 1 
percent respectively. The results imply that with development and a general 
growth in wage of women, more women would be drawn into wage work compared to 
self employment and fertility would decline. The assets owned by the women exert 
a distinct and significant negative effect on participation in wage work and 
positive effect on fertility. The equality of asset effects is rejected in all 
the labor force participation and choice of work equations but not in the 
fertility equations. This implies that women with more bargaining power prefer 
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to consume more leisure but the distribution of assets does not have any impact 
on fertility. 
Experiments with alternative procedures to correct for sample selection 
bias found that the multinomial logit model seems to be appropriate since the 
choice decision is trichotomous rather than dichotomous. The estimates of the 
wage equations indicate a private of returns to education of 13 percent and 11 
percent respectively for men and women. 
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Footnotes 
1. Japan is an exception among the developed countries. See Hill (1983) for an 
analysis of the women's participation in the informal sector. 
2. The data are from the various quinquennial surveys on employment and 
unemployment conducted by the National Sample survey Organization (NSSO). From 
1972-73, the NSSO has maintained comparable and consistent definition of workers. 
It should be noted that the worker population ratio is computed population of all 
ages which includes children and aged dependents. 
3. Malathy ( 1989) estimates the parameters of the labor supply function 
correcting for endogeneity of children. Location of residence before marriage, 
number of rooms in the house and religion are used as identifying variables. 
However, these turn out to be not statistically significant. 
4. The demand functions includes price of goods as an exogenous variable. As the 
households face same price in a cross section data like ours, the price variables 
are not included in the regressions. 
5. The .dependent var.iable is discrete and takes nonnegative integer values. To,-. 
take into account this nature of the dependent variable, a poisson model is 
applied. The sign and significance of the parameter estimates are similar to the 
OLS results. However, the poisson model is more appropriate for shorter constant 
period of about 5 years before the survey. In that case it captures the more 
recent pattern of fertility (see Schultz, 1992). In our sample about two-thirds 
of the women report no children ever born in the last 5 years. For this 
definition of the dependent variable, most of the explanatory variables turn out 
to be insignificant. I also tried to apply the ordered probit model since it 
takes into account the right censoring, as many women have still not completed 
fertility. The sign and significance of the ordered probit estimates are similar 
to the OLS estimates reported in the text. Hence the ordered probit estimates 
are not reported. 
6. Squared terms in the asset variables were introduced but they turned out to 
be not statistically significant. 
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Labor Force Participation 
Wife participation (dichotomous) 0.300 0.459 
Wife wage work (dichotomous) 0.163 0.370 
Wife self employed (dichotomous) 0.137 0.344 
Husband participation (dichotomous) 0.925 0.264 
Husband wage work (dichotomous) 0.582 0.493 
Husband self employed (dichotomous) 0.342 0.474 
Fertility 
Number of children ever born 3.125 1.515 
Exogenous Variables: 
Wife's hourly wage (predicted) 4.915 3.009 
Husband's hourly wage (predicted) 9.486 4.388 
Wife's education (in years) 5.761 4.694 
Husband's education (in years) 9.082 4.644 
Wife's assets (in 1000 rupees) 16.470 19.623 
Husband's assets ( in 1000 rupees) 50.863 68.954 
Wife's age (in years) 36.066 8.080 
Husband's age ( in years) 42.735 8.453 
Wife's experience(age-education-5) 25.306 9.741 
Husband's experience (age - education - 5) 28.653 10.038 
Sample size 1276 
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Table 2 







Wife's education .0706 
(7.10) 
Wife's experience • 0607 . 
(3.15) 
Experience square -.00136 
(3.56) 
Husband's assets -.00166 
(Xl0-3 ) (2.20) 
Wife's assets - • 0112 







Log likelihood -715. 54 
LR Test: Dichotomous 
Versus Trichotomous(x7
2 ) 
Test of equality of 
asset effect (x1
2 ) 10.98 
Wage ln(hourly) ln(hourly) 
Earner wage wage 
(MLE) (OLS with A) 
2 3 4 
-2.232 -.786 -0.918 
(6.84) (2.18) (0.95)b 
0.112 0.133 0.135 
(9.06) (10.83) (7 .09) 
0.0708 0.0724 0.0770 
(2.97) (4.89) (2.27) 
-0.00114 -0.000714 -0.000857 















Self Wage ln(hourly) 
Employed Earner Wage 
(Mlogit) (OLS with i..) 
5 6 7 
-1.720 -3.638 -. 777 
(3.00) (6.66) (2.85)b 
.0288 .209 .133 
(1. 30) (9.16) (16.23) 
.0620 0.127 .0715 
(1.41) (3.18) (5.85) 
-.00214 -0.00223 -.000695 










a. Asymptotic 't' values in parentheses 
b. Absolute 't' values in parentheses 
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Table 3 
Reduced Form Labor Force Participation and Wage Equations Estimates for Men 
Parti Wage ln(hourly) ln(hourly) Self Wage ln(hourly)
-cipate Earner Wage Wage Employed Earner Wage 
(Probit) (MLE) (OLS with A) (Mlogit) (OLS with A}
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Constant 2.327 -.0836 -.0568 -0.0787 4.357 4.013 .0531
(5.79)a (-.28) (-.38) (0.52)b (4.93) (4.85) .345) 
Husband's education -0 .107 .205 .110 0.138 -.273 -.190 .1095
(7 .04) (2.16) (7.65) (3.80) (8.21) (6.07) (8.11) 
Husband's experience 0.0526 .192 .0578 0.0421 .0673 .0856 .0569
(2.13) (1.01) (8.34) (4.50) (1.29) (1. 77) (7.37) 
Experience square -.00138 -.000208 -.000548 -0.000170 -.00243 -.00233 -.000539
(3.21) (-.65) (4.58) (0.92) (2.69) (2.78) (4.13) 
Husband's assets -.000601 -.00338 .00123 -.00446
(xl0-3) (.83) (5.38) (. 82) (2.71) 
Wife's assets .00136 -.00494 .00936 -.00089
(xl0-3) (.46) (2.56) (1.57) (-.14) 
-1.151 -.0428









Log Likelihood -309.56 -1234.7 -1051. 1 
LR Test: Dichotomous 
Versus Trichotomous(x7
2 ) 66.12
Test of equality of 
asset effect (x 1
2 ) 0.40 0.59 0.51 0.73 
a. Absolute (Asymptotic) 't' values in parentheses
b. Absolute 't' values in parentheses 
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Table 4 
Estimates of Labor Force Participation of Women 
Constant 
Wage of wifec 




























Wife's age square -0.00271 
(-3.07) 
(-0.00760] 
Log likelihood -408.97 
LR Test: Dichotomous 
Versus Trichotomous(x7
2 ) 
Test of equality of 
asset effect (x1




























a. Asymptotic 't' values in parentheses 
b. Marginal values in brackets. 






















































Regression Estimates of Fertility Equations 
OLS 
1 2. 
Constant -3.229 -3.241 
(-4.59)a (-4.62) 
Wage of Wifeb -0.174 -0.178 
(-9.96) (-10.15) 
Wage of Husbandb -0.0451 -0.0435 
(-3.78) (-3.65) 
Wife's assets 0.00309 0.00848 
(xl0-3) (1.68) (2.20) 
Wife's assets square -0.657 
(xl0-10) (-1. 77) 
Husband's assets 0.000894 0.000223 
(xl0-3) (1. 71) (2.62) 
Husband's assets square -0.0327 
(xl0-10) (-2.16) 
Wife's age 0.312 0.307 
(7.71) (7.60) 
Wife's age square -0.00272 -0.00264 
(-4.88) (-4.74) 
x2/ ~ .366 .366 
Tests of Equalit2 of asset effects (X /F) 1.122 1.417 
a. 't' values in parentheses 
b. Predicted values (see text for explanation). 
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Table 6 
OLS Estimates of Fertility Equations by Age Group 
Age 20-29 Age 30-39 Age 40-49 
1 2 1 2 1 2 
Constant 2.181 1.899 -2.519 -2.897 -40.879 -42.035 
(0.25)a (0.46) (-0.29) (-0.34) (-2.67) (-2.76) 
Wage of Wifeb -0.250 -0.2534 -0.210 -0.208 -0.168 -0.173 
(-6.33) (-6.36) (-6.05) (-5.98) (-6.59) (-6.76) 
Wage of Husbandb -0.0607 -0.0584 -0.0596 -0.0612 -0.0284 -0.0263 
(-2.63) (-2.51) (-2.84) (-2.91) (-1.52) (-1.41) 
Wife's assets 0.00389 0.00225 0.00765 0.0143 0.000159 o. 0111 
(xl0-3) (1.50) (0.434 (2.42) (2.28) (0.05) (1.50) 
Wife's assets square -0.142 -0.824 -11. 192 
(xl0-10) (-0.28) (-1.31) (-1.73) 
Husband's assets 0.00259 0.00485 0.000228 0.000863 0.000607 0.00196 
(x10·3 ) (2.65) (2.22) (0.25) (0.55) (0.73) (1. 34) 
Husband's assets sq. -0.11368 -0.0232 -0.0275 
(xl0-10) (-1.14) (-0.65) (-1.26) 
Wife's age -0.174 0.154 0.303 0.321 2.035 2.079 
(-0.53) (-0.47) (0.61) (0.64) (2.96) (3.03) 
Wife's age square -0.00837 0.00799 -0.00292 -0.00319 -0.0224 -0.0228 
(-1.28) (1.22) (-0.40) (-0.44) (-2.91) (-2.98) 
-2 
R 0.404 0.403 .234 .235 .209 .214 
Test of Equality 
of asset effects(F) 0.178 0.124 4.307 2.079 0.0154 1.598 
Sample Size 350 350 438 438 488 488 
a. 't, values in parentheses 
b. Predicted values (see text for explanation). 
